

EFP 2.0: A Multi-Agent Epistemic Solver with Multiple e-State Representations



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Multi-Agent Epistemic Reasoning

Reasoning about actions and information has been one of the prominent interests since the beginning of the AI [6].

In particular, our work studies a family of problems recently considered in the automated reasoning scenario [7]. That is, the *Multi-agent Epistemic Planning problem* (MEP) that, differently from most of the other approaches, is not only interested in the state of the world but also in the *knowledge* or *beliefs* of the agents.

Epistemic reasoning, initially formalized by logicians in the early sixties, rapidly evolved into *Dynamic Epistemic Logic*, a formalism used to reason not only on the state of the world but also on *information change* in dynamic domains.

As discussed in [7]: “*information is something that is relative to a subject who has a certain perspective on the world, called an agent, and that is meaningful as a whole, not just loose bits and pieces. This makes us call it knowledge and, to a lesser extent, belief.*”

A New Epistemic-State Representation

Reasoning about *beliefs* is not as direct as reasoning on the “physical” state of the world. One of the main issues is that expressing belief relations between agents often implies to consider *nested* and *group* beliefs that are not easily extracted from the state description by a human reader. This inherent complexity is reflected in computational overhead that brings, most of the time, infeasibility to the solving process. That is why, in this work, we present an *Epistemic Forward Planner* integrated with a new *epistemic state* representation called *Possibilities*.

Possibilities (firstly introduced in [4]) are *non-well-founded* data structures that corresponds with a whole class of *bisimilar* Kripke structures.

Possibilities

Let \mathcal{AG} be a set of agents and \mathcal{F} a set of propositional variables:

- A *possibility* u is a function that assigns to each propositional variable $f \in \mathcal{F}$ a truth value $u(f) \in \{0, 1\}$ and to each agent $ag \in \mathcal{AG}$ an information state $u(ag) = \sigma$.
- An *information state* σ is a (non-well-founded) set of possibilities.

Each possibility u contains both an *interpretation of the world* and of each *agent's beliefs*. That is, the component $u(f)$ assigns a truth value to the fluent f in u , while $u(ag)$ represents the (non-well-founded) set of possibilities that could be true w.r.t. the agent ag .




Figure 1: Transition from a possibility to a Kripke structure

An updated Transition Function

As first main contribution we presented the *formalization of a new transition function* for the action language $m\mathcal{A}^p$, an epistemic action language initially introduced in [3]. The updated epistemic action language borrows its syntax from $m\mathcal{A}^*$ [1] but *changes the underlying e-state representation* from Kripke structures to possibilities.

In particular, as $m\mathcal{A}^*$, $m\mathcal{A}^p$ distinguishes between three types of actions:

- **Ontic** actions: used to modify certain properties (*i.e.*, fluents) of the world
- **Sensing** actions: used by an agent to refine her beliefs about the world
- **Announcement** actions: used by an agent to affect the beliefs of other agents

Moreover, the languages also identify three possible levels of observability for an agent w.r.t. to an action a :

- **Fully observant** if ag knows about the execution of a and about its effects on the world
- **Partially observant** if ag knows about the execution of a but she does not know how a affected the world
- **Oblivious** if ag does not know about the execution of a

The transition function formalized in our work (the details are available in the paper), is more compact and, therefore, more understandable than the original one introduced in [3].

The “simplicity” of the e-states update formalization is reflected in a much *cleaner and faster implementation* and allowed us to formally demonstrate that $m\mathcal{A}^p$ can be used for multi-agent epistemic reasoning. In particular, we ensured that any planner based on $m\mathcal{A}^p$ satisfies the following propositions, that fully capture the concept of beliefs update:

- If an agent is **fully aware** of the execution of an action instance then *her beliefs will be updated* with the effects of such action execution
- An agent who is only **partially aware** of the action occurrence *will believe* that the agents who are **fully aware** of the action occurrence *are certain about the actions effects*
- An agent who is **oblivious** of the action occurrence will also be **ignorant** about its effects.




Figure 2: e-states size generated following the semantics of $m\mathcal{A}^*$ (left) and of $m\mathcal{A}^p$ (right) after a plan of length four.

A Comprehensive Epistemic Planner: EFP 2.0

EFP 2.0 is a comprehensive **Epistemic Forward Planner** derived from a complete refactoring of EFP 1.0 [5]. Let us briefly list the main characteristics of EFP 2.0:

- The planning process executed by EFP 2.0 is a *breadth-first search*
- Allowing for a **multiple e-state representation**, is able to reason on both $m\mathcal{A}^*$ (based on Kripke structures) and $m\mathcal{A}^p$ (based on possibilities)
- Integrates a *Kripke structures size reduction* following the algorithm introduced in [2]. That is, starting from a generic Kripke structure, EFP 2.0 computes the *bisimilar* state with minimal size.
- Finally, EFP 2.0 introduces the concept of “*already visited e-state*”

Results

EFP 1.0 = planner of [5]

K-MAL = EFP 2.0 + K. structures

K-OPT = K-MAL + e-state reduction

P-MAR = EFP 2.0 + possibilities

TO = Time Out (25 m)

WP = Wrong Plan

-NV = w/o visited check




Figure 3: Comparison between EFP 1.0 and EFP 2.0's best configuration on SC

Grapevine									
$ \mathcal{AG} $	$ \mathcal{F} $	$ \mathcal{A} $	L	K-MAL-NV	K-MAL	K-OPT-NV	K-OPT	P-MAR-NV	P-MAR
3	9	24	2	.09	.09	.14	.15	.03	.02
			4	9.19	8.13	10.20	9.95	1.34	1.25
			5	94.49	75.32	84.07	75.87	8.67	7.71
			6	372.64	278.93	291.62	230.69	27.63	20.26
4	12	40	2	1.85	1.786	2.33	2.34	.17	.18
			4	403.11	274.53	205.00	152.07	13.49	7.31
			5	TO	TO	TO	1315.38	123.54	36.54
			6	TO	TO	TO	TO	427.97	108.64

Table 1: Runtimes for the Grapevine domain comparing the configs. with and w/o (-NV) the visited e-states check.

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