

# Generating Explanations for Temporal Logic Planner Decisions

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# Our (long-term) goal

- Agents which can
  - **Learn** interpretable objectives (through language and behavior) [1]
  - **Behave** competently with respect to these objectives, *even when they conflict* [2]
  - **Explain** their behaviors to human teammates in terms of these objectives (and correct objectives or world models if needed)
- ... all while operating in the same environments (MDPs) in which reinforcement learning agents have been successfully deployed.

[1] Kasenberg, D., & Scheutz, M. (2017, December). **Interpretable apprenticeship learning with temporal logic specifications**. In 2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) (pp. 4914-4921). IEEE.


[2] Kasenberg, D., & Scheutz, M. (2018, April). **Norm conflict resolution in stochastic domains**. In Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence.

# Markov Decision Processes

A tuple  $\mathcal{M} = \langle S, A, P, s_0, \gamma, \mathcal{L} \rangle$ , where

- $S$  a finite set of *states*
- $A$  a finite set of *actions*
- $P : S \times A \times S \rightarrow [0, 1]$  a *transition function*
- $s_0 \in S$  an *initial state*
- $\gamma \in [0, 1)$  a *discount factor*
- $\mathcal{L} : S \rightarrow 2^\Pi$  a labeling function
  - $\Pi$  is a set of atomic propositions
  - $\mathcal{L}(s)$  is the set of propositions true at  $s$
- Our explanation approach assumes *deterministic*  $\mathcal{M}$

# Example: ShopWorld



- Agent is a robot sent to go shopping for its user in a store selling a watch
- User wants the watch, but gives the robot insufficient money

# Linear temporal logic (LTL)

- A simple propositional logic encoding time

$$\phi ::= p \mid \neg\phi_1 \mid \phi_1 \vee \phi_2 \mid \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2 \mid \phi_1 \rightarrow \phi_2 \\ \mid \mathbf{X}\phi_1 \mid \mathbf{G}\phi_1 \mid \mathbf{F}\phi_1 \mid \phi_1 \mathbf{U} \phi_2$$

where  $\phi_1, \phi_2$  are LTL statements,  $p$  a proposition.

- $\mathbf{X}\phi_1$ : “in the next time step,  $\phi_1$ ”
- $\mathbf{G}\phi_1$ : “in all present and future time steps,  $\phi_1$ ”
- $\mathbf{F}\phi_1$ : “in some present/future time step,  $\phi_1$ ”
- $\phi_1 \mathbf{U} \phi_2$ : “ $\phi_1$  will be true until  $\phi_2$  becomes true”

# LTL specifications in ShopWorld

“leave the store while holding the watch”



$\mathbf{F}(leftStore \wedge holding)$

“never leave the store while holding an object that has not been bought”  
(no shoplifting)



$\mathbf{G}\neg(leftStore \wedge holding \wedge \neg bought)$

# Preferences over LTL objectives

- We can give each objective  $\phi_i$  a *priority*  $z_i \geq 0 \in \mathbb{Z}$  and a *weight*  $w_i \geq 0 \in \mathbb{R}$
- Violations of objectives with the same priority can be traded off (using their weights as an “exchange rate”)
- Violations of objectives with different priorities can't be traded off: the agent prefers to satisfy the higher-priority objective and violate any number of lower-priority objectives
  - Lexicographic ordering
- $\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{w}$  induce a relation  $>_{(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{w})}$  over vectors in  $\mathbb{R}^n$

# Multi-objective LTL planning problem

$$\mathcal{P} = \langle \mathcal{M}, \Phi, \mathbf{w}, \mathbf{z} \rangle$$

where

- $\mathcal{M} = \langle S, A, P, s_0, \gamma, \mathcal{L} \rangle$  a Markov Decision Process
- $\Phi = \phi_1, \dots, \phi_n$  a set of (safe/co-safe) LTL objectives
- $\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{z}$  are the weight and priority vectors respectively



# From LTL to finite state machines

- We use syntactically (co-)safe LTL objectives
- For each such objective  $\phi_i$  we can construct a finite state machine (FSM)

$$M^{\phi_i} = \langle \Sigma^{\phi_i}, Q^{\phi_i}, \delta^{\phi_i}, q_0^{\phi_i}, F^{\phi_i} \rangle$$

which accepts on  $\tau$  if  $\tau$  is a *bad* (*good*) prefix of  $\phi_i$

- e.g.  $\mathbf{F}(leftStore \wedge holding) \rightarrow$  good prefix any finite trajectory where  $leftStore \wedge holding$  hold at some  $t$
- Use this to construct product MDP  $\mathcal{M}^{\otimes}$  whose state space is  $S \times Q^{\phi_1} \times \dots \times Q^{\phi_n}$

# Solving the LTL planning problem

$$\text{Let } \text{Sat}(\phi, q) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \phi \text{ co-safe and } q \in F\phi \\ -1 & \text{if } \phi \text{ safe and } q \in F\phi \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Then we can define a product-space reward function

$$\mathbf{R}^{\Phi}(s^{\otimes}, a, s^{\otimes'}) = \begin{bmatrix} \text{Sat}(\phi_1, q'_1) - \text{Sat}(\phi_1, q_1) \\ \vdots \\ \text{Sat}(\phi_n, q'_n) - \text{Sat}(\phi_n, q_n) \end{bmatrix}$$

and thus  $\mathcal{P}$  can be framed as a reward maximization problem on  $\mathcal{M}^{\otimes}$  (solvable with value iteration):

$$\max_{\pi^{\otimes}} \left( \mathbb{E}_{\tau^{\otimes} \sim \pi^{\otimes}} \left[ \sum_t \mathbf{R}^{\Phi}(s_t^{\otimes}, a_t, s_{t+1}^{\otimes}) \right], >_{(\mathbf{z}, \mathbf{w})} \right)$$

# LTL “why” queries

- We consider queries of the form **Why**  $\psi$ ? where  $\psi$  is an arbitrary (safe/co-safe) LTL statement
- Interpretation: “why did the agent act in such a way as to make  $\psi$  hold?”
- Examples in ShopWorld:
  - **Why**  $G \neg leftStore$ ?  
“why didn’t the agent leave the store?”
  - **Why**  $G \neg bought$ ?  
“why did the agent never buy the watch?”
  - **Why**  $G \neg (leftStore \wedge holding)$ ?  
“why didn’t the agent leave the store while holding the watch”

# Minimal evidence for an unsatisfactory trajectory

- We define the *minimal evidence* that a trajectory  $\tau$  is unsatisfactory for an LTL statement  $\phi$  as:

$$\text{EVIDENCE}(\tau, \phi) = \min\{|E| : E \subseteq \{0, \dots, T\} \times L(\Pi);$$

$$\tau \models E;$$

$$\text{for all } \tau' \text{ s.t. } \tau' \models E, \tau' \notin \text{Traj}_{\checkmark}(\phi)\}$$

where

- $L(\Pi)$ : positive and negative literals of  $\Pi$
- $\text{Traj}_{\checkmark}(\phi)$ : good prefixes of  $\phi$  if  $\phi$  co-safe  
non-bad prefixes of  $\phi$  if  $\phi$  safe
- e.g. in ShopWorld:

$$\text{EVIDENCE}(\tau, \mathbf{F}(\textit{leftStore} \wedge \textit{holding})) = \{(0, \neg\textit{holding}), (1, \neg\textit{holding})\}$$

# Explanation structures

- The agent responds to a “why” query with an *explanation structure*

$$\langle \Gamma, E, \tau', E' \rangle$$

where

- $\Gamma \in \{\text{QUERYFALSE}, \text{NEGQUERYIMPOSSIBLE}, \text{ALTQUERY}\}$
- $\tau'$  is a trajectory (or  $\emptyset$ )
- $E$  contains one or more pairs  $(\phi, \text{EVIDENCE}(\tau, \phi))$  where
  - $\phi$  is an LTL statement
  - $\text{EVIDENCE}(\tau, \phi)$  is a set of (timestep, literal) pairs sufficient to show that  $\tau$  is unsatisfactory for  $\phi$
- $E'$  is as  $E$ , but for  $\tau'$

# Answering “Why $\psi$ ?”

1.  $\tau \models \psi$ ? If not, return

$\langle \text{QUERYFALSE}, \{(\psi, \text{EVIDENCE}(\tau, \psi))\}, \emptyset, \emptyset \rangle$

(“ $\psi$  is not, in fact, true”)

e.g. Why  $G\neg leftStore$ ?

$\langle \text{QUERYFALSE}, \{(G\neg leftStore, \{(1, leftStore)\})\}, \emptyset, \emptyset \rangle$

2. Is there some achievable  $\tau'$  s.t.  $\tau' \models \neg\psi$ ? If not, return

$\langle \text{NEGQUERYIMPOSSIBLE}, \emptyset, \emptyset, \emptyset \rangle$

(“ $\psi$  is true because impossible to make  $\psi$  false”)

e.g. Why  $G\neg bought$ ?

# Answering “Why $\psi$ ?”

3. Compute a trajectory  $\tau'$  that maximally satisfies  $\Phi$  such that  $\tau' \not\models \psi$

- The solution to the new planning problem

$$\langle \mathcal{M}, (\Phi, \neg\psi), \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{w} \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{z} \\ \max_i z_i + 1 \end{bmatrix} \rangle$$

- Return the explanation structure

$\langle \text{ALTQUERY}, \{(\phi, \text{EVIDENCE}(\tau, \phi) : \tau \text{ unsatisfactory for } \phi)\},$

$\tau', \{(\phi, \text{EVIDENCE}(\tau', \phi) : \tau' \text{ unsatisfactory for } \phi)\}$

(comparing  $\tau$  and  $\tau'$  in terms of their satisfaction of  $\Phi$ )

- Because  $\tau$  maximally satisfies  $\Phi$ , this structure indicates how satisfying  $\psi$  would compromise the agent’s ability to satisfy  $\Phi$

# Answering “Why $\psi$ ?” in ShopWorld

query: **Why** $\mathbf{G}\neg(\text{leftStore} \wedge \text{holding})$ ?  
“why didn’t you leave the store while holding the watch?”

1.  $\tau \models \mathbf{G}\neg(\text{leftStore} \wedge \text{holding})$ ? ✓
2.  $\exists \tau'$  s.t.  $\tau' \not\models \mathbf{G}\neg(\text{leftStore} \wedge \text{holding})$  ✓
3.  $\tau' : \text{pickUp}, \text{leaveStore}$

return:

$\langle \text{ALTQUERY}, \{(\mathbf{F}(\text{leftStore} \wedge \text{holding}), \{(0, \neg\text{holding}), (1, \neg\text{holding})\})\},$   
 $\tau', \{(\mathbf{G}\neg(\text{leftStore} \wedge \text{holding} \wedge \neg\text{bought}),$   
 $\{(2, \text{leftStore}), (2, \text{holding}), (2, \neg\text{bought})\})\}\rangle$

- Indicates that while the true trajectory fails to leave while holding the watch, the only way to satisfy  $\psi$  would have been to steal the watch, which would violate a higher-priority specification



# From explanation structures to natural language

- We integrated this functionality with the NL pipeline in DIARC, a robotic architecture [3, 4]
- Specifications and queries in an object-oriented extension to LTL (*violation enumeration language; VEL*) allowing quantification over objects
- Utterance  $\rightarrow$  VEL query  $\rightarrow$  explanation structure  $\rightarrow$  natural language response

[3] Kasenberg, D., Roque, A., Thielstrom, R. and Scheutz, M., 2019. **Engaging in Dialogue about an Agent's Norms and Behaviors**. In Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on Interactive Natural Language Technology for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (NL4XAI 2019) (pp. 26-28).

[4] Kasenberg, D., Roque, A., Thielstrom, R., Chita-Tegmark, M. and Scheutz, M., 2019. **Generating justifications for norm-related agent decisions**. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Natural Language Generation (pp. 484-493).

# Natural language explanations

- Example: ShopWorld with two objects (*glasses* and *watch*); agent can afford one
  - Buys the glasses, leaves the watch

Input utterance	VEL query	Explanation in memory	Output utterance
“Why didn’t you buy anything?”	Why $\forall x.G \neg bought(x)$ ?	$\langle \text{QUERYFALSE}, \{(\forall x.G \neg bought(x), \{(2, bought(glasses))\})\}, \emptyset, \emptyset \rangle$	“I bought the glasses”
“Why didn’t you buy everything?”	Why $\exists x.G \neg bought(x)$ ?	$\langle \text{NEGQUERYIMPOSSIBLE}, \emptyset, \emptyset, \emptyset \rangle$	“It was impossible for me to buy everything”
“Why didn’t you leave the store while holding everything?”	Why $\forall x.G \neg (leftStore \wedge holding(x))$ ?	$\langle \text{ALTQUERY},$ $\{(\mathbf{F}(leftStore \wedge holding(watch)),$ $\{(0, \neg holding(watch)),$ $(1, \neg holding(watch)),$ $(2, \neg holding(watch))\})\}, \emptyset, \tau',$ $\{(\mathbf{G} \neg (leftStore \wedge holding(glasses)$ $\wedge \neg bought(glasses)),$ $\{(3, leftStore),$ $(3, holding(glasses)),$ $(3, \neg bought(glasses))\})\} \rangle$	“I could have left the store while holding everything, but that would have violated more important rules”
$\leftrightarrow$ “How would you have done that?”			“I would have picked up the glasses, picked up the watch, bought the watch, and left the store”
$\leftrightarrow$ “What rules would you have broken?”			“I would have left the store while holding the glasses, which I had not bought”
$\leftrightarrow$ “How would that have been worse?”			“Leaving the store while holding the glasses which I had not bought is worse than not leaving the store while holding the watch”

# Future work

- Incorporating explicit causal models (esp. in `NEGQUERYIMPOSSIBLE` case)
- Tailoring explanations to interactant knowledge
- Adapting to stochastic environments
  - Need to represent multiple trajectories or probability distribution
- Improving efficiency of planner
  - Impractical for nontrivial domains
- Dropping assumption that agent has perfect knowledge of transition dynamics

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